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Abstract
Despite the pressing need for computerized Information Systems (IS) in both public and private sectors of
developing countries, research shows that most IS are not performing the role successfully and do not achieve
the desired objectives. There is increasing focus on risk factors associated the non-technical issues that impact
significantly upon development success.
Through the lens of a government IS project for the Ministry of Social Development (MOSD) in the Sultanate of
Oman, we identified resistance as an outcome driven from non-technical risk factors that negatively affected the
project. We found that where a change in the top management occurred there was an associated risk attached to
any extant IS development projects. The incoming top management change in IT strategy inadvertently created
a gap between the new business objectives (non-technical) and existing beliefs impacting directly on
development success.
Using Leavitt’s (1964) Socio-Technical Model as a framework of organizational change we put forward an
extended model aimed at handling gaps emanating from non-technical risk factors. In this way, we contribute to
the body of knowledge within the IS development domain and also seek to contribute to better understanding of
the significance of such resistance driven from non-technical risk factors in IS projects within developing
countries.
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RESISTANCE AS A NON-TECHNICAL RISK
IN INFORMATION SYSTEMS
DEVELOPMENT.
A CASE STUDY IN THE SULTANATE OF
OMAN
1.

Introduction

Despite the pressing need for the creation and use of computerized Information Systems in
both public and private sectors of developing countries, research shows that most information
systems (IS) are not performing the role successfully and do not achieve the desired
objectives. Within developing countries there is increasing focus on risk factors associated
with non-technical issues that impact significantly upon development success and potential
solutions. However, the information systems relevant to the public sector vary from those in
the private sector, and risk factors that apply to software development projects are different
from those that apply to systems in operation (Bada, 2000; Heeks, 2002; Krishna and
Walsham, 2005; Salazar, 2001; Qassim, 2008).
Our study begins at the time when a change of top management in the Ministry of Social
Development (MOSD) in The Sultanate of Oman had taken place. A changeover of top
management is often referred as a change of ‗ownership‘ of the department concerned. We
learned that the incoming management had instigated a change in IT strategy and
subsequently requested a new Social Benefit System. This had inadvertently created a gap
between the new management business objectives (non-technical) and the previous business
rationale that subsequently resulted in opposition from the users. The new development
project has encountered a number of delays since its inception.
Utilizing this development project as a case study approach we seek to investigate the
rationale behind the degree of resistance experienced that impacted upon the success of the
project. The new system was sanctioned by the Council of Ministers of the Sultanate to
replace the legacy system which at more than 13 years old was experiencing some limitations
with data needed to deliver the volume of critical reports required by key decision-makers.
The development of the new system was outsourced to a software company but is being
managed internally by a Ministerial Technical Team. Examination exposed that the
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significant levels of non-technical risk factors experienced have created resistance among
users which subsequently affected the project causing significant delay (18 months) since
inception. However, the ensuing problems of user resistance were not because of applying
change (as change deemed for improvement of organizational performance) but due to the
way of presenting and applying change. Our research study supports the views that where a
change in the government top management (ownership) occurs then there is an associated
risk to extant IS or development projects due to any accompanying changes in IT strategy
(this is discussed further later in the paper).
Using Leavitt‘s (1964) Socio-Technical Model as a framework of organizational change we
put forward an extended model aimed at identifying gaps emanating from non-technical risk
factors. We therefore examine the underlying causes of the resistance experienced and ask
specifically ‗Why was there such unexpected resistance to the new system?‘ In this way, we
contribute to the body of knowledge within the IS development domain. We also seek to
contribute to a better understanding of the significance of resistance as an outcome borne
from non-technical risk factors in governmental IS projects within developing countries.
As the principle researcher is a member of the Ministerial Technical Team an interpretative
action research stance was adopted within the case study setting. The qualitative data
gathering methods of participant observation, questionnaires, interviews and project artefacts
were used to gather a depth of data aimed at increasing the understanding behind the issues
being examined (Myers, 2009; Silverman, 2006). The multi-method approach allowed
triangulation to take place during the data analysis in order to increase the validity of the
research findings (Denzin and Lincoln 2000, Saunders et al., 2007).

We next put forward a discussion of the theoretical context, followed by the research
approach and methods adopted and the problem situation is outlined. We then present our
analysis and findings in the discussion section and present finally our conclusions.

2.

Theoretical Context

Information systems development is a high risk task, and failures remain common regardless
of advances in technologies and the increasing sophistication of development tools. Indeed,
the 2009 Standish Group's report shows a marked decrease in project success rates, informing
that only 32% of all projects are delivered on time, on budget and with the required features
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and functions. 44% were classified as late, over budget, and/or with less than the required
features and functions, whilst the remaining 24% are considered failures and are cancelled
prior to completion or delivered and never used.
Understanding the risk factor per se is an essential part of managing risks in IS development
projects such that appropriate counter measures can be taken (Schmidt et al., 2001; Chaffey
and White, 2011). Risk can be defined as a condition that can present a serious threat to the
successful completion of a software project i.e. the likelihood of an adverse occurrence
(March and Shapira, 1987; Kroenke, 2006).
The literature acknowledges that there are numerous risk factors related to information
systems development. Both technical aspects and social factors have been extensively
documented (Mumford, 1983; Myers, 1999; Suchman, 1987; Wynn, 1979). However, more
recent research into IS failure has suggested that although much emphasis has been placed on
the technical aspects, ‗the primary cause of failure is the lack of consideration ascribed to the
social and behavioural dimensions of the implementation process itself’ (Adekoya et al.,
2007, p107). Indeed literature has categorized the non-technical factors impacting upon
systems development success as Social, Cultural, Economic and Political (Bussen et al.,
1997; Heeks, 2002; Shore, 1998; Walsham et al., 2007). More specifically, failure has been
attributed to non-technical factors such as not meeting user requirements, low levels of user
acceptance, not involving the right users, lack of user participation, poor communication, lack
of executive support, inherent cultural behaviour and so on which all represent risks (Bada,
2000; Beynon-Davies, 1998; Bulter, 1991; Heeks, 2002; Krishna and Walsham, 2005;
Lapiedra et al., 2006; Lyytinen et al., 1999). However, by categorising risks in this way there
is a potential ‗risk‘ of missing other causal issues (Crawford et al., 2005).
Although social methodologies such as the soft system methodology (SSM) of Checkland
(1981, Checkland and Scholes, 1990) and Mumford‘s socio-technical approach (1983) have
evolved, the high rate of failure persists. One view is that the social system in the host
organization influences the behaviour and relationships of the stakeholders involved (Rodney
et al., 2010). Equally, it is difficult for technical people to identify the underlying social
norms that relate to human relations within the development arena when their focus is
concentrated upon the IT requirements of the system under development (Shore 1998). This
is even more complex when development is outsourced.
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Leavitt‘s (1964 in Lyytinen et al., 1998) open system model of organizational change (see
figure 1.) will be used as an analytical framework to investigate and analyze issues of early
risks in the project. The model aims to achieve a synthesis of major dimensions of software
risk management while promoting change. It has been widely used to classify schools of
organizational change in respect of managing the process of change. It has also been
extensively used in the IS literature (Mumford, 1981; Lyytinen et al., 1998).
The Actors represent all system stakeholders (users, managers and IT team members and so
on), Technology refers to the use of development tools, methods and platforms of software
and hardware; Structure specifies the culture of the environment and type of project in the
host organization and Task signifies the expected outcomes in terms of goals and
deliverables. There is a strong relationship between these four model components and ‗a
change in any socio-technical component or relation in a system development process can
create variation which, in the extreme, can lead to a failure of the system, otherwise known
as loss.’ (Leavitt, 1964 in Lyytinen et al., 1998).

In this way, the model provides a

foundation to analyze the content of causal dependencies informing risk management
approaches and proposes that these dependencies can relate to any or the entire components.

Figure 1. A Socio-Technical Model; Leavitt 1964
Our

research centres on the success of IS projects within developing countries and we utilize

the case study setting in The Sultanate of Oman as a vehicle to explore these issues further.
Indeed, as we mentioned previously, published research shows that the majority of
Information Systems across both public and private sectors of developing countries are not
performing their role successfully and do not achieve the desired objectives relative to nontechnical issues (Heeks, 2002; Qassim, 2008; Krishna and Walsham, 2005). Thus, there is
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considerable debate surrounding potential solutions of the non-technical risk factors
associated with IS within developing countries (Bada, 2000; Salazar, 2001).
Although there is neither evidence nor theoretical basis that failure rates in developing
countries are worse than figures in developed countries, Heeks (2002) suggests that there is
practitioner evidence and practical reasons to sustain the idea that failure rates in developing
countries may be higher than those in developed countries. Through his research he
concludes that the significant majority of IS projects in developing countries fail in some way
citing human and social (non-technical) factors as key causal elements.
Montealegre (1999) believes that the majority of research focuses "on conditions rather than
actions and behaviors, and on weaknesses rather than on ways of overcoming them" (p201).
He suggests that as a consequence previous research lacked theoretical underpinnings or
presentation of models. Additionally, another viewpoint is that successful information
systems development tends to match its environment in relation to the social and
organizational factors (Bada, 2000; Heeks, 2002; Walsham, 2001). This includes the values,
perceptions and assumptions of key stakeholders and as such is culturally rooted (Berger and
Beynon-Davies, 2009). An observation is that in Arabic organizational culture, little
importance is attached to the engagement of users in IS development which may
subsequently lead to system failure. It is also widely reported that end users, in general, are
resistant to change and the greater the degree of change, the greater the risk of failure (Mann,
2002).
During the auditing of public sector IT Projects, the State Audit Institution (SAI) in the
Sultanate of Oman (2007) has observed that although reporting of the outright failure of IT
Projects was rare, failure to achieve all project objectives within the envisaged time and cost
is common. They suggest that a potential new challenge for IT projects emanates from any
changeover of ‗ownership‘ of governmental organizations. By this we mean that where a
change in top management takes place, the incoming management may review the extant IT
strategy effecting changes. It can be argued that in The Sultanate of Oman as IT strategy has
to be dovetailed to the business strategy this may alter with a change in top management and
can even result in project termination or shorter life span. In our case the degree of resistance
that proved problematic was a direct consequence of overlooking the non-technical risk
factors caused by the way that changes to the IT strategy were managed.

Page 6/23

The case study setting enables us to examine the rationale behind the resistance experienced
that proved challenging for the Social Benefit System‘s new IS project of MOSD in the
Sultanate of Oman.

3.

Research Approach

A research philosophy is a belief about the way in which data about a phenomenon should be
gathered, analysed and used (Myers, 1997; Saunders et al., 2007. All research (whether
quantitative or qualitative) is based on some underlying assumptions about what constitutes
suitable research and which research methods are appropriate (Hirschheim, 1992).
Information Systems qualitative research involves the use of qualitative data collection
methods to understand and explain social phenomena to provide the IS community with
useful qualitative information. Action research, case study research and ethnography are
examples of qualitative methods. Qualitative data sources include observation and participant
observation (fieldwork), interviews and questionnaires, documents and texts, the researcher‘s
impressions and reactions (Myers 2009) and recording and transcribing (Silverman, 2006).
3.1

Action Research

As the principle researcher is an employee of the case study setting the research approach
adopted is that of action research. This leans towards an interpretive philosophy as advocated
by Yin (2009) and Baskerville (1999). Action research has been used in social science since
the 1940‘s as a research strategy that combines theory with practice through change and
reflection. It aims to solve current practical problems whilst increasing scientific knowledge
(Myers, 2009) with ‗more precise theories of social change‘ (Lewin, 1946, p40) and
managing change (Cunningham, 1995). Lewin (1946) first proposed a cycle of planning,
action and fact-finding. Moreover, he emphasized praxis, or theory/practice integration, thus
action research was about action and research: both practice and theory (Dick et al., 2009).
There are numerous definitions of action research; however, one of the most widely cited is
that of Rapport (1970) who defines ‗Action research aims to contribute both to practical
concerns of people in an immediate problematic situation and to the goal of social science by
joint collaboration with a maturely acceptable framework’ (in Myers, 2009 p499). Hult and
Lennung‘s (1978 cited in Avison et al., 1999) confirm that action research assists in practical
problem solving, expands scientific knowledge, is performed collaboratively in an immediate
situation utilizing data feedback in a cyclical process aimed at increasing understanding of a
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given social situation. We are guided by Susman and Evered‘s (1978) action research cycle
(see figure 2 below) consisting of diagnosing, action planning, action taking, evaluating, and
specifying learning. Action research has been adopted and developed successfully as an
approach to information systems research (Avison et al., 1999; Baskerville and WoodHarper, 1996; Checkland, 1981; Mumford, 2001).

1.Diagnosing
Delay the first process due to
appreciation gob, cultural gab, and
precieved usefullness

5. Specifying learning
The positive results of social risks
awareness and its potential causes
helped to reform the initial
objectives of the project ,
increased system ownership and
eliminates resistance

2. Action Planning
Apply transparency among MOSD
team to bride non-technical gabs ,
Determine goals for the project
with no interfere with other
system parties

3. Action taking 4. Evaluating
Assess users acceptance of the
required system; recognized change
in behaviors and attitudes toward
the system

Figure 2. The Action Research Cycle (based on Baskerville 2001; Susman and
Evered 1978). The figure is populated with steps encountered in one intervention of this research.

However, there are some disadvantages of action research. For example, its highly situational
nature, this means that each action research project is to some at extent unique, making it
difficult to put forward general laws regarding its adoption (Avison et al., 2001). A further
disadvantage is the perceived lack of researcher‘s impartiality and bias (Avison and WoodHarper, 1991). The recommendation is to adopt aspects of control and key strategies to the
ensure rigour and validity of the research (Baskerville and Wood-Harper 1996). However, the
use of multiple data sources, strengthened through triangulation, increases the robustness of
results, and such bias can be minimized (Yu, 2003). Cross-validation is achieved when
different kinds and sources of data converge and are found to be congruent (Yin 2009).
Thus, our approach aims to build an unbiased understanding of both theory and practise, and
the relationship between them. The interpretive stance relates to the ability for social
intervention into the research setting to enhance an understanding of the context of the
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information system and the process in which the information system is influenced by its
context (Onwuegbuzie et al., 2009; Walsham, 1997).

3.2

Case Study approach

As mentioned earlier the principal researcher is as an employee of the research organization
and thus, adopted an action research approach. The utilization of a case study is a practical,
and popular inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context,
(Myers, 2009; Yin, 2009). Robson (2002) defines case study as ‗a strategy for doing research
which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within
its real life context using multiple source of evidence’ (p178). The case study research
method is particularly well-suited to IS research, since the object of IS discipline is the study
of information systems in organizations, and interest has shifted to organizational rather than
technical issues (Benbasat et al., 1987 in Myers, 1999).
However, it is argued that case studies can be considered weak as they are typically restricted
to a single organization and it is difficult to generalize findings as it is hard to find similar
cases with similar data. However, generalization can be achieved by sample size or sampling
frame (Saunders et al., 2003) and that can be achieved in our case study because it is all about
one specific country, one type of organizations and one researcher. Nevertheless, over time,
as more action research studies are completed more general models of the meaningful
contexts of various aspects will be possible. Also the ability to generalize from one case study
to theory (Walsham, 1997; Yin, 2009; Myers, 1999) implies it is possible to generalize from
one action research to theory (Myers, 1999).
3.3

Research Methods

In action research data can be collected through observations, interviews, action experiments
and participant-written cases (Baskerville, 1999). The choice of a specific qualitative research
method in action research is independent of the underlying philosophical position adopted
which can be positivist (Clark, 1972), interpretive (Elden and Chisholm, 1993) or critical
(Carr and Kemmis, 1986). This research is combining qualitative methods to provide a richer,
contextual basis for interpreting and validating results. To gain a relevant background,
secondary research on extant literature of the theoretical context was conducted
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The qualitative data gathering methods of participant observation, interviews and
questionnaires were used to gather a depth of data aimed at increasing the understanding
behind the issues being examined (Myers, 2009; Silverman, 2006). Participant observation
occurred in situ for intensive periods of time (months) and involved observing people during
the course of their daily routines and activities within the project environment. The
questionnaire was designed to enable the researcher to get the required quantitative and
qualitative primary data utilizing both open and closed questions (Myers, 1997; Saunders et
al., 2003; Silverman, 2006; Yin, 2009). We can confirm that 99% of participants participated,
as one employee had left the organization. Outcomes from the questionnaire led to a schedule
of formal interviews, which were subsequently conducted with the relevant top management
of the project. Although formal in nature (due to the cultural context) these sessions were
sufficiently flexible to facilitate a free flow of information to collect the needed qualitative
data.

4.

The Problem Situation (Case Study)

The case study concerns the development of information systems for a government
organization in The Sultanate of Oman - the Social Benefits System of the Ministry of Social
Development (MOSD). The new system was sanctioned by the Council of Ministers of Oman
to replace the current system which is more than 13 years old. The users believe that top
management under evaluated the importance of the existing system and were looking for a
modern, more automated system. The Council of Ministers assigned a Project Committee that
was chaired by the Minister of National Economy (MONE), with members of MOSD and
MONE to determine the new system‘s requirements and to manage the project. The
Committee‘s chairman formed a technical team from both ministries mainly to prepare the
new system‘s feasibility study and manage the system development process (see table 1
below).
Ministerial Technical Team Composition
General Director of Statistics and Research
MONE
General Director of Financial Affairs
MOSD
Director of Social Care
MOSD
1. Director of Global Positioning System (GPS)
MONE
IT Directors
MOSD, MONE
Systems Analysts
MOSD, MONE
IT Programmers
MOSD, MONE
Social Workers
MOSD
Table 1. Technical Team Composition
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The existing system does not provide MOSD (new top management) and MONE with the
essential level of detail about existing and potential beneficiaries necessary for accurate
assessment of benefit status. Further critical detail is vital to generate the required reports
sufficient for key decision-makers to make assessments and judgments (in line with Omani
Social Benefit Law 1984) about claimants‘ entitlements to any of the social benefit services.
Currently all employees (directors to social workers) use the system on a ‗sharing data‘ basis
using a computerized central database to store data from all locations (32 branches) across the
region so that they can handle complex calculations and generate the required financial
reports and allowing greater user autonomy. Additionally, public users will also be able to
interact with the system directly by using electronic forms via the Internet.

The intention is to implement a full prototype across one branch and then to evaluate and
review it before rolling it out across the rest of the region (32 branches). Although it is not
possible to provide further detail about this project at this time, we can confirm that the new
system‘s key requirements were assigned to the IT department Committee by the Council of
Ministers of Oman and the proposed new system was imposed upon the users by the new top
management.
The new development project has encountered a number of difficulties since its inception. A
delay in preparing the new system‘s feasibility study documentation had a ‗knock-on‘ effect
across other project activities. Such delay is attributed to the assigned Technical Team (table
1. above) and accounted for an 18 month setback.
Traditionally MOSD employees had a good reputation for accepting changes in information
systems and in adapting to new technologies previously developed by the Ministry IT team.
A shared interpretation across the organization is that the formal purpose of information
systems is to support and bring about organizational change in order to improve the
functioning of the organization. However, early resistance to the new system from the MOSD
side was clearly evident. The Director of Social Care and his social workers (who are a part
of the Technical Team) opposed the new system. It is somewhat paradoxical that the MOSD
IT team resisted the idea of having a new system which contradicts their former positive
reputation of accepting change in the context of overall organizational change. Thus, our
Research Question asks ‗Why was there such unexpected resistance to the new system?‘
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5.

Findings

Although the acceptance of an information system by managerial, professional, and
operational users is deemed a necessary condition for its success (Al-Gahtani and King,
1999), it is widely reported that resistance to change to computer systems is a widespread
problem (Au et al., 2008; Igbaria and Chakrabarti, 1990; Mann, 2002; Wicks, 2002). We
locate the causal factors for the problematic delays around issues of resistance to change that
generated the level of risk experienced.
Examination of the empirical data affirms that, in our case, the MOSD IT team believed that
the formal purpose of information systems is to support and bring about organizational
change in order to improve the functioning of the organization. However, although there is
evidence of positive cooperation with previous organizational change situations, open
resistance to the new system from MOSD users was clearly obvious. This was totally
unexpected. Even though the Director of Social Care Department and his social workers
(members of the Technical Team) were used to accepting changes in previous information
systems as well as adapting to new technologies paradoxically they opposed the new system.
Investigation into the rationale behind the resistance experienced suggests that the review of
IT strategy undertaken by the incoming top management (i.e. change in ‗ownership‘ of the
government organization) impacted upon the development of the new system in a number of
ways. Revisiting our research question, we asked ‗Why was there such unexpected resistance
to the new system?‘
Our findings identified four ‗levels‘ of non-technical gaps which we put forward as the main
cause for project resistance. These are Cultural Gap, Communication Gap, Appreciation Gap
and Communication and Relationship Gap. The first three gaps occurred among MOSD
Actors [see figure 1 above] generating a level of resistance which resulted in the fourth gap
between MOSD and MONE Actors. We found that the resistance experienced among MOSD
Actors generated a Communication and Relationship Gap between MOSD and MONE. This
eventually had a negative impact on the Task variable and caused delay. We next discuss the
non-technical risk factors that created system‘s resistance in terms of their impact.
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First Level of Resistance – Cultural Gap within MOSD
Analysis of the empirical data gathered reveals that the first level of resistance materialized
when the Council of Ministers and incoming top management named the new project
‗Establishing a database to record social beneficiary cases‘. This caused offence to the
MOSD employees who believed that this title implied that there was no existing or current
electronic database. Evidence to the contrary exposes this as untrue. An existing database
containing valuable data detailing social benefits case since 1996 was disregarded firstly by
the incoming top management, and subsequently by the Council of Ministers. Employees felt
that their thirteen years of previous hard work, effort and loyal contributions to the
organization had been ignored. The Director of Social Care confirmed that ‘there is doubt
concerning honesty and integrity of his social workers’. This coupled with the disinterest in
the extant system by top management offended employees and left them feeling disrespected.
Consequently the Technical Team asked the MOSD‘s top management to change the title of
the project to ‗Establishing a new database to record social beneficiary cases‘ or ‗Developing
the existing database‘ instead of the given title. However top management decided that the
name could not be amended because it had been already announced in local media. This was
a great disappointment to the MOSD employees who are members of the social care domain
and the IT team. Such a response undermined the users‘ perception of their own self-esteem.
They felt that top management attached greater importance to their own strategy rather than
upon employee honour and integrity.
In fact, as advocated by Mann (2002), end-users, IT management and top management all
adopt the culture of his/her own profession, these differences in culture are differences in
behaviours and norms and create significant cultural gaps among actors. Thus, the users, IT
management and top management behaved according to the culture and values of their own
area of activity [job] making it difficult for effective interaction to occur. Such a cultural gap
might cause the perspective of one group to be limited which could cause additional gaps
among actors. This form of imposing change is de-motivating and the Technical Team
described it as ‗disruptive change‘. It created resistant among employees regardless whether
they agreed or disagreed with that particular change issue (Mann, 2002).
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Second Level of Resistance – Communication Gap within MOSD
The second level of resistance was caused by the lack of discussion between the top
managers and the users. The entire MOSD team agreed that ‘No clear objectives have been
proposed’, there had been no shared or common communication allowing those affected by
the system change to comment or debate. The MOSD IT director said, ‗They have decided
without consultation, and regardless of the impact, they have made the decision’.
Indeed we evidenced that there was little consulting or inclusion of the MOSD employees in
the planning stages of the project. Communication between IS professionals, IS staff and IS
users is critical to the successful completion of an IS development project (Hornik et al.,
2003). They point out that the ability to interact with all potential stakeholders in an
organization, to clearly document requirements, and to effectively express ideas has long
been recognized by researchers and practitioners as critical success factors. Such an obvious
flaw exacerbated an already sensitive situation.
Third Level of Resistance – Appreciation Gap within MOSD
The third level of resistance originated from the intended degree of change in the proposed
new system that led the Project Committee‘s chairman to outsource the software
development. The MOSD IT team perceived this decision in a negative light. They felt that
their management, technical skills and competences had been incorrectly evaluated. Both the
MOSD IT director and his systems analysts believed that ‗the new requirements can be
applied in the existing system without the need to implement the whole system again’. Lack of
transparency meant that there was no clear rationale behind the decision to outsource and to
rebuild the whole system. Thus, once again the employees felt ignored and disregarded. They
resisted the project to avoid dealing with complexities caused by the outsourcing of the
project. Heeks (2002) believes that this form of system failure is a key concern in developing
countries.
In situations where one stakeholder group implicitly feels unappreciated by the other, that
their loyalty, commitment and contributions to the organization go unrecognized, then an
‗appreciation gap‘ is generated (Mann, 2002). This is what resulted in the case study setting.
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Fourth Level of Resistance – Communication and Relationship Gap between MOSD
and MONE
The fourth and more significant level of resistance occurred when, regardless of the obvious
degree of resistance, The Technical Team of MOSD valiantly attempted to collaborate with
the members of Technical Team of MONE in an effort to accommodate user requirements of
the new system. This was totally unsuccessful. It became apparent that MOSD‘s Technical
Team could not communicate with MONE Technical team and could not work as one team
(as assigned by the committee). This was attributed to the high level of resistance among
MOSD team members who felt that they did not have ownership of the system.
Consequently, relationships between the people in the Technical Team proved difficult and
were further compounded by the other levels of resistance discussed above. MONE had
difficulty in recognizing and accepting the problems of the other team (MOSD). In reality
the low levels of understanding between the teams, coupled with the resistance generated a
significant relationship gap that negatively affected the project and caused delay. Mann
(2002) proposes that ‗when each group's pre-judgements of the other group never become
resolved. Relationship becomes 'us' versus 'them'’ (p256). However, we surmise that such a
gap between MOSD users and their top management was a key causal factor that figured in
the negative behaviour of stakeholders that significantly contributed to the degree of
resistance and subsequent project delay. Table 2 summaries the key resistance factors of the
risks discussed above as identified through the cyclic action research stages.
Action Research
Cycle Stages
1. Diagnosing

Time
Period
From
9-2008
To
12-2009

2. Action Planning

12-2008

Stages Descriptions
The main reason for the delay experienced was due to resistance among
MOSD team. This resistance was a subsequent result of the non-technical
gaps which were encountered among MOSD while introducing change.
The Cultural Gap between MOSD management and (IT and Business
users) created an Appreciation Gap among (IT and Business users), this
resulted a Communication Gap between the two groups.
The resistance among MOSD created a relationship gap between them
and MONE technical members and had a negative impact to the
designated task (feasibility study ) and cased 18 months of delay
Apply transparency among MOSD team to bridge non-technical gaps.
Determine goals for the project with no interference with other system
parties.
In an effort to apply transparency an open dialogue among members of
the Technical Team and business personnel proposed aimed at
engendering transparency among the different stakeholders. The intent is
to provide an opportunity for employees to discuss the incoming top
management‘s new objectives regarding a change of the existing benefits
system to bridge the cultural gap. It was hoped by presenting the new
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3. Action taking

1-2009

4. Evaluating

1-2009

5. Specifying learning

(ownership) top management‘s rationale positively that compromises
could be reached to bridge the Appreciation Gap and subsequently
enhance communication among MOSD actors.
An anticipated outcome was to increase system ownership among MOSD
technical team.
As planned, meeting to identify the non-technical risks factors has been
introduced, clarified and discussed among the MOSD team.
After assessing users acceptance of the required system a positive change
was recognized in behaviours and attitudes toward the system. Once the
Cultural Gap was clarified and resolved, the Appreciation Gap and the
Communication Gaps resolved automatically.
The increased level of system ownership among MOSD helped them and
MONE to communicate better.
The positive results of transparency and non-technical risks awareness
helped to reform the initial objectives of the project with no interference
from other system stakeholders, eliminated resistance among actors and
increased system ownership.

Table 2. The research’s action research cycle stages

5.1

Extension of Leavitt’s Socio-Technical Model

In figure 3 below we have positioned the non-technical gaps identified through our research
study to extend Leavitt‘s Socio-Technical model. The model illustrates how a non-technical
gap can create further gaps which create resistance within the Actors variable. Consequently,
such resistance has a negative impact upon the Task variable. We present this model to
facilitate better understanding of the negative effects of such gaps. In our specific case the
problem identification stage exposed the gap between Technical Team and top management
in MOSD. This created another gap in the same variable, but this time between MOSD and
MONE teams which negatively affected the task variable.

Figure 3. Extension of Leavitt’s Socio-Technical Model showing how resistance emanates from nontechnical gaps
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6.

Conclusions

We have discussed above the need for any IT strategy of an organization to match its
business strategy for it to succeed. Unless a project‘s strategy dovetails with the business
strategy the IT project will not succeed. In our case we acknowledge that a change in
management (ownership) of the organization will result in a review of the existing business
strategy. This in turn will have implications on the existing IT strategy as well as the IT
applications in use or under development at that time.
From the four levels of resistance identified we conclude that the first three elements of
resistance experienced in this case study context reflect beliefs, attitudes and individual
reactions towards the proposed change. Indeed, this concurs with Knights and Murray (1994
cited in Goldfinch, 2007) ‗like any situation involving humans, IS developments involve…
struggles for individual autonomy, power and value dominance… and personality clashes’
(p924). We further note that the reversal experienced in the former positive behaviour of
acceptance towards IT changes by employees was brought about by their belief that they felt
disrespected and disregarded by top management (Bhattacherjee and Premkumar 2004; Davis
et al., 1989; Venkatesh et al., 2003).
Thus, we surmise, that in our case, the complexities of technological development were
further complicated by the complexities of human relations (Goldfinch, 2007), such that the
attitudes had an impact on behaviour (Melone, 1990). We witnessed how the MOSD
employees‘ attitudes played a significant role in influencing their subsequent behaviour
(Fishbein and Ajzen, (1975) in Al-Gahtani and King, 1999) which effected project delay.
It is our fourth dimension of resistance that is the most noteworthy. It is clear that a lack of
transparency and subsequent unawareness of the each others (MOSD) and (MOSD vs.
MONE) sphere of activity and responsibility that was to blame. We refer to the need for a
clear understanding of the gaps identified within the Technical Teams and top management.
More specifically it is important to recognize the associated negative impact if resistance of
non-technical issues is not resolved successfully. Additionally with regard to the impact of
the incoming (ownership) top management‘s proposed change objectives for IT strategy both
transparency and working in partnership are crucial. Potential benefits would be the
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awareness of the rationale behind the new purpose, intentions and objectives resulting from
the change in ownership in order to reach compromise where necessary such that the
optimum project success is achieved.
We have extended Leavitt‘s (1964) Socio-Technical Model by positioning our identified nontechnical gaps (risks) and their inter-relationships that need to be considered and which are
key when managing change. In other words, the adapted model recognizes how the
relationships between these identified gaps, and their consequences, can impact upon
Leavitt‘s acknowledged variables. In this way, we contribute to the body of knowledge
within the IS development domain and also provide a better understanding of the significance
of such resistance driven from non-technical risk factors in IS projects within developing
countries.
Finally, what is required to reverse user resistance in our case study? We suggest that to
reverse users‘ negative intention and behaviour (resistance) applying transparency within the
working environment is key (Alavi and Leidner, 1999; Street and Meister, 2004). We believe
that in our empirical study a first step towards a transparent environment would be to bridge
the identified non-technical gap between IT Technical Teams and the business users, and top
management of MOSD and MONE. By raising awareness of the non-technical problems to
the top management (in our case the Council of Ministers) it is possible to instigate resistance
management policies to address such issues reoccurring.
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